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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to examine how the demand for
independent audits and the German accounting profession evolved
from the late 1800s to the early 1930s despite the absence of competitive market forces. The paper posits that cultural ideologies, specifically with respect to nationalism, paternalism and anti-individualism,
provide reasons for the unique configuration of not only the German
corporate/banking structures responsible for originating financial reports but the accounting profession that audited them. As the Germ a n accounting profession was in an embryonic stage, it was not
capable of successfully confronting the corporate/banking alliance to
significantly impact financial reporting or the demand for audits.
Economic crises served as the dominant pressure for business reform
and legislation mandating audits in Germany.

In 1931, a Presidential Decree and the ensuing Company
Law mandated annual audits for large public firms in Germany
(Aktienqesellschaften, or AGs), and gave government sanction to
the German accounting profession.1 Perhaps due to their importance for the national economic good, the AGs were the only
non-service companies subject to mandatory audits. The limited
liability companies (Gesellschaften mit heschränkter Haftung or
GmbHs), and the sole proprietor operations escaped the effects
of the new Company Law. Tax law, however, regulated the accounting of these latter two entities [Düring, 1939; Beuck,
1939].
Although the German legislature had made numerous attempts to amend the Company Law as early as 1926, Stock1

The 1931 Company Law not only changed the accounting profession but
also further regulated financial reporting by specifying classification formats
and valuation techniques for balance sheet and profit and loss accounts. The
1931 Commercial Code also contained regulations related to the general shareholders meeting and to management's responsibility for annual reports [Voss,
1933].
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company and bank failures precipitated the emergency Presidential Decree and rapid enactment of the revised Company
Law [Grossmann, 1930; Düring, 1939; Abel, 1967]. The draft of
the 1931 Company Law cited the recent collapse of various enterprises, including the second largest i n s u r a n c e c o m p a n y
FAVAG, to illustrate the need for mandatory audits [Dykxhoorn
and Sinning, 1989a]. Semler [1939] argued that the new law
was a direct effort on the part of the government to prevent
future company failures.
From World War I (WWI) to the 1930s, the German government struggled with critical national economic problems such
as r e p a r a t i o n p a y m e n t s a n d Kapitalnot
[ S c h m i d t , 1934].
Kapitalnot refers to the shortage of capital that followed WWI as
a result of reparation payments to the victorious Allies, German
investment in tangible goods to fight hyperinflation, and the
importation of foodstuffs and raw materials. A disconcerted
public placed pressure on the legislature for economic reorganization that redefined auditor accountability and provided the
framework for the reform of accounting and auditing standards
[ D ü r i n g , 1939; S e m l e r , 1939; Stolper, 1940; Abel, 1967;
Dykxhoorn and Sinning, 1989a].
Several explanations exist for the emergence of audits and
an accounting profession to provide auditing services. Wallace
[1985] and DeAngelo [1981] depict audits as a commodity, subject to the same laws of supply and demand as any other commodity in an unregulated competitive market. They suggest that
audits serve as a monitoring device for outside stockholders to
deter management stealth and management decisions contrary
to owners' interests. 2 Audits possess value because they provide
a means to improve the quality of financial statements for both
investors and management, thereby enhancing user confidence
in the audited information. Both authors argue against the need
for mandatory audits, stating that government regulation may
be inefficient since private mechanisms of contracting and pricing may serve to supply society's informational needs. 3 If audits
2

See Jensen and Meckling [1976] for a discussion on the demand for audits
as a monitoring device.
3
Authors such as Previts and Merino [1979] offer evidence that private market mechanisms do not provide a sufficient supply of financial information to
investors. A corporate philosophy that equates secrecy to success, such as that
found in the Ivar Kreuger case [Flesher and Flesher, 1986], suggests that the
business sector may withhold information requisite for investor decisions.
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possess value in unregulated markets, as Wallace [1985] and
DeAngelo [1981] suggest, then such markets also require an accounting profession to provide the audit services.
Germany's financial markets lacked a strong competitive atmosphere and did not exhibit a compelling demand for independent audits during the first three decades of the twentieth
century. Harmony among the German corporate, banking and
government interests and lack of widespread ownership served
to diminish the need for monitoring and external access to inf o r m a t i o n [Abel, 1971; D y k x h o o r n a n d S i n n i n g , 1989a;
Gallhofer and Haslam, 1991]. Thus, audit demand does not appear to provide a strong basis for the emergence of the German
accounting profession.
Theories drawn from the sociology of professions literature
offer arguments other than audit demand for the emergence of
an accounting profession. During the 1960s, sociologists began
to take a new approach that viewed professions as political
groups which can influence economics, markets, the state and
class systems [Freidson, 1986]. Some sociologists posit that
members of occupational groups employ specialized knowledge,
credentialism and closure to establish professions that externally delineate their disciplines from other occupations [Larson,
1977]. 4 If a profession can control the educational requirements
and admission to its field, it can optimize its position of power
in the market by controlling the supply of labor.
Freidson [1986, p. 35] warns that the term profession must
be employed as "a historically and nationally specific 'folk concept'." He claims that professions only arise in industrial countries influenced by Anglo-American institutions. 5 After the arrival of industrialization in England and the U.S., strong market economies, decentralized passive governments and laissez
faire attitudes enabled successful occupations to achieve monopolistic professional power in competitive, unregulated markets.

4

Freidson [1986] describes credentials as items that provide information
regarding the ability of a worker. Examples are diplomas, professional certification, licenses and personal testimonials. Closure refers to the ability of a profession to exclude u n w a n t e d outsiders in o r d e r to achieve m a r k e t control
[MacDonald, 1985].
5
Individuals entering the preindustrial professions of law, medicine and religion achieved status through attending respected universities and through elitist
stations acquired by birth [Freidson, 1986].
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These conditions, Freidson [1986] argues, did not exist in
industrialized continental Europe where occupations did not
have to campaign for status. The middle class achieved status
through education at elite, state sponsored educational institutions [Freidson, 1986]. Graduates often obtained positions in
civil service organizations or technical jobs in large cartels. Bureaucratic entities, not market position, offered occupational security and protection. Freidson's analysis suggests that accounting professions only emerge in conjunction with competitive
market forces and would not appear under a bureaucratic government and communal ideology such as that found in Germany.
The arguments of Wallace [1985], DeAngelo [1981] and
Freidson [1986] pose the question:
Does only one form of economic system, i.e., competitive markets, generate a demand for independent audits
and an accounting profession?
Abercrombie et al. [1986] provide evidence that may explain
how audits and the German accounting profession existed in
the absence of competitive market forces. They submit that
capitalism can surface under diverse ideologies and suggest that
these ideologies affect the way capitalism is implemented. Thus,
the form of capitalism found in a given country usually reflects
the dominant ideology in that country. Using Japan as an example, Abercrombie et al. [1986] illustrate how cooperative
capitalism can co-exist with the societal attributes of nationalism, paternalism and anti-individualism that stress collective responsibility rather than individual competitive effort.
Abel [1971] offers an additional explanation for the emergence of the German accounting profession. He argues that
throughout the history of Germany, economic collapses, not the
evolution of accounting theory, have been the chief motivating
factor for Company Law adjustments. Economic crises, not
competitive market forces, may have been the motivation in the
d e m a n d for external audits. This study suggests that the universal concepts of nationalism, paternalism and anti-individualism,
found in Abercrombie et al. [1986], provide contextual richness
for understanding how economic events are reflected in the
structural evolution of institutions such as the corporate/banking alliance in Germany, and in turn, the accounting profession.
The analysis attempts to understand how political, economic
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and social conditions impacted the emergence of the accounting
profession in Germany despite the lack of competitive market
forces to demand audits.
Awareness of the interaction among political, social and
economic forces may assist in the current effort towards harmon i z a t i o n of a c c o u n t i n g s t a n d a r d s . Dykxhoorn and Sinning
[1989b] note that Germany delayed adoption of the European
Economic Community (EEC) Fourth Directive for seven years.
The intention of the Directive was to harmonize accounting
practice within the EEC. One means of European harmonization was the extension of mandatory audits to limited liability
companies. The authors state that the Directive, rather than
promoting unanimity, fostered discord within the German accounting profession. Sensitivity to the ideological history of the
German accounting profession may have provided insight into
conflicts over EEC directives and the resistance of the German
accounting community to accounting and auditing harmonization.
This paper first defines the analytic narrative methodology
[Porter, 1981] that the analysis employs to examine the emergence of the German accounting profession. Next, the paper
discusses the ideologies of nationalism, paternalism and antiindividualism and explains how these three concepts influenced
German institutions. Included in this discussion is an analysis
of the impact of the corporate/banking alliance on accounting
practice and the evolution of the accounting profession. The
study then traces the evolution of the German accounting profession from the nineteenth century, but focuses on its development during the first three decades of the 1900s. 6 The analysis
ends with the economic crises of the 1930s, the accompanying
federal legislation mandating audits and the establishment of
the new professional accountant, the Wirtschaftsprüfer
(WP).
Wirtschaftsprüfer can be translated literally as economic examiner [Summary, 1939, p. 96]. These accountants are licensed
statutorily m u c h as Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) in the
United States (U.S.) today. The analysis concludes that despite
an environment of cooperative capitalism, a demand for independent audits evolved. Economic crises provided the need for
6
As most early accountants also performed auditing duties, this study uses
the term practitioner in a universal sense that includes accountants and auditors
without attempting to differentiate between the two roles. The paper does not
include an examination of managerial accounting.
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business and accounting reform, while Germany's ideological
interpretation of the universals of nationalism, paternalism and
individualism structured the accounting profession in a culturally unique way.
METHODOLOGY
The study employs the literature from Porter's [1981]
theory of emergence to trace the evolution of the German accounting profession and its interaction with the socioeconomic
factors of the period. Emergence refers to the "process of organization through which each entity becomes temporarily and
spatially connected with its antecedent world" [Porter, 1981, p.
74]. Porter [1981] explains that the historical event consists of a
unique pattern of emergence where each event singularly interacts with antecedent conditions by culling specific attributes
which pertain solely to itself. Porter's [1981] methodology consists of an analytic narrative designed to focus on the chronological pattern of similar occurrences followed by a backward
contrasting between subsequent and prior events to analyze
their association. The retrospective process highlights
d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s , or u n e x p e c t e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s , t h a t m a y be
marked by the initial sequential analysis.
The first step in an analytic narrative is to identify a phen o m e n o n of interest which in this study is the emergence of
legislation mandating audits. Then, in explaining the temporal
sequence of an event, the researcher should examine the ascending hierarchical interaction of individuals, groups, institutions, concepts (ideas and principles), fields (disciplines such as
economics) and the "most abstract level of thought, universals,
involved in a specific event's organization [Porter, 1981, p. 86].
This analysis treats the accounting profession as an institution that interacts with other institutions such as the corporate/
banking community and the national government (see Figure
1). Three primary accounting groups: academics, book examiners and audit companies, constitute the institution of the Germ a n accounting profession during its evolutionary period in the
first three decades of the twentieth century. Throughout the
study, the analysis considers the interaction of these groups and
institutions with concepts, such as secrecy, disclosure, and
monitoring, socioeconomic phenomena, and lastly with the cultural attributes of nationalism, paternalism and individualism,
which it treats as universals.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss2/8
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FIGURE 1
Porter's [1981] Ascending Hierarchy of Elements Applied to
the Emergence of the 1931 Germany Company Law
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THREE PREVAILING IDEOLOGIES AND THEIR IMPACT
ON GERMAN INSTITUTIONS
Abercrombie et al. [1986] suggest that three cultural elements: nationalism, paternalism and individualism, influence
the form of capitalism, and other societal structures, extant in a
nation. The analysis employs Abercrombie et al.'s [1986] approach in suggesting that the German accounting profession
emerged in an economic and political atmosphere that reflected
communitarian concepts rather than an ideology based on individualism.
Nationalism as a Characteristic of Germany
The coexistence of nationalism with capitalism in modern
Germany demonstrates the contradiction inherent in the evolution of German political ideology. Free-trade and social democracy co-existed. During the eighteenth century, national Prussian policies promoted the growth of Cameralism (Mercantilism) that supported the protection of the markets from foreign
intrusion. Cameralism, the predominant economic policy of the
period, was synonymous with the creation of a state institution
embodying a national economy [Schmoller, 1967]. Liberalism,
while used to justify arguments for free trade, always remained
shrouded in a tradition of state involvement that shielded market positions.7 Industries and trade groups frequently looked to
the government for protection.
The evolution from feudalism to industrialism promoted
the formation of joint-stock companies during the 1800s.
Throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century,
large German corporations maintained an interactive relationship with the Reich government. The German government actively promoted consolidation, perceiving cartels as more effi-

7
Liberalism in Germany referred to a policy of individual freedom, but unlike that found in England or France. German liberalism remained cloaked in
"the Cameralist tradition of state intervention" and a sense of community
[Hasek, 1925, p. 90]. Industries and trade groups, economically depressed by
unregulated competition, looked to the government for protection. The state
frequently intervened by nationalizing particular industries, such as the railroad
and the utilities, considered essential for the country's good. Direct government
supervision, however, did not ensue until the banking crises of 1931 and did not
become the norm until the advent of National Socialism [Stolper, 1940].

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss2/8

8

Harston:Harston:
GermanThe
accounting
profession
-- 1931 and
before:
A reflection of national
German Accounting
Profession
— 1931
and Before
147 ideologies
cient t h a n a free market. 8 Turner [1985] and Gallhofer and
Haslam [1991] suggest that cartels depended on the German
government for financial survival; the Reich's purpose in preserving the large corporations was to maintain industrial production and employment.
Gallhofer and Haslam [1991] conclude that the German
government condoned conservatism and secrecy over disclosure
to promote corporate stability. Banks became so powerful that
they were able to compel secrecy while simultaneously earning
the trust of the public. The public generally did not have an
abiding faith in laissez faire economics, therefore, corporate
concentration and secrecy did not generate vigorous criticism,
until a time of crisis [Semler, 1938; Gallhofer and Haslam,
1991].
The Impact of Paternalism
Paternalism evolved from the Junker feudalistic perception
of noblesse oblige [Stern, 1975]. Nobility conferred an obligation
to behave charitably towards all people. Hegel's notion of the
subordination of the individual to the State to promote the communal good may have been an evolutionary consequence of the
early feudal tenet of noblesse oblige. The government responded
to the social problems of industrialization by enacting paternalistic social reforms such as health insurance and work-hour improvements in an effort to repress further labor revolt [Ullmann,
1981; Gallhofer and Haslam, 1991]. Paternalism helped to justify establishment of a modified corporate welfare system in
Germany.
Executives of the large corporations also exhibited the characteristic of noblesse oblige in attempts at improving worker
welfare. 9 However, Hay [1981] argues that after WWI German
industrialists dropped social welfare as a positive tactic to prevent strikes and maintain production when the social programs
failed to increase worker efficiency and preserve peace. Despite
the limited degree of welfare reform, an ostensible paternalistic
attitude enabled bankers and industrialists to avoid recrimina8

Unlike the U.S., the German government did not enact anti-trust legislation
to foster competition.
9
See Tampke [1981] and Stolper [1940] for examples of labor welfare measures such as guaranteed fixed incomes, eight-hour work days and prohibition
of Sunday labor for women and children.
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tions of greed and self-interest. The State assumed that executives and cartel directorates would exercise effective paternalistic control that would protect the public and promote the national good. Corporate stability would benefit all.
The Impact of

Anti-individualism

Abercrombie et al. [1986] define three types of individualism: political liberalism, economic or classical liberalism, and
individuality or Romanticism. Political liberalism implies equal
rights for each person. Economic liberalism, represented by a
utilitarian laissez-faire perspective, posits that market self-regulation will maximize the well being of a nation. Prussians were
not egalitarian and classical liberalism never existed even as a
rudimentary ideology [Stern, 1975]. The only form of individualism found in Germany was that of the R o m a n t i c which
stressed individual genius, not individual rights. 10 German individualism accepted rigid controls through bureaucracy as long
as society permitted freedom of thought.
German Romantic individualism, tempered by a strong nationalistic and paternalistic tradition, enjoined everyone to work
for the communal good and led to cooperative capitalism. Cooperative capitalism did not provide an environment conducive to
individual competition where professional market protection
through the achievement of status and credentials were requisite to professional survival.
The Impact of the Corporate/Banking
On Accounting Practice

Alliance

Two major institutions, stock c o r p o r a t i o n s (AGs) a n d
banks, interacted with the accounting profession in establishing
accounting and audit practice. Germany's system of cooperative
capitalism sustained a climate of anti-individualism whose laws
supported cartels and failed to protect individual shareholders
o r e n c o u r a g e w i d e s p r e a d stock o w n e r s h i p [Gallhofer a n d
Haslam, 1991]. The Prussian Commercial Code of 1884 ostensibly protected minority shareholders by furnishing the right to
challenge accounting statements at general assembly meetings
[Gallhofer and Haslam, 1991]. However, minority shareholders

10

For examples of thoughts on the freedom of individual genius within the
Romantic Movement, see Schlegel [1968] and Schleiermacher [1977].
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rarely marshalled sufficient support to meet the Code ownership percentage requirements for protests. Disclosure of financial data to protect the average investor did not become a major
issue. Abel [1971] concludes that the primary intent of governm e n t regulation was to protect the creditors, not the shareholders.
Kreditbanken 11 were closely linked with the AGs and served
in t h e d u a l roles of c r e d i t o r s a n d majority s t o c k h o l d e r s
[Neuburger, 1977]. Their main purpose before WWI was the
long-term capitalization of industry. Sparkassen, similar to U.S.
savings and loan institutions, supplied credit to individuals and
small businesses [Northrop, 1938]. Banks owned the majority of
corporate stock, served on corporate boards, were involved with
stock market speculation and had little concern with the interests of individual minority shareholders [Northrop, 1938; Baker,
1970]. By 1933, only six banks controlled all financial institutions. Banks had a competitive advantage. They collected all
necessary financial information via ownership and supervisory
board representation and through their own audit companies,
the Treuhandgesellschaften
[Abel, 1971; Gallhofer and Haslam,
1991]. Therefore, they did not favor independent audits and full
disclosure.
Interlocking directorates, encouraged by the government to
maximize the n a t i o n s well being, provided a mutually supportive linkage between corporations and banks. German supervisory boards, composed of management from banks and other
stock corporations, were responsible for internal auditing, the
presentation of reported earnings at the annual shareholders'
m e e t i n g , a n d a p p r o v a l of c e r t a i n b u s i n e s s a r r a n g e m e n t s
[Gallhofer and Haslam, 1991; Dykxhoorn and Sinning, 1989a]. 12
The institutional structure may have precluded supervisory
boards from being effective monitors when corporate management was involved with fraud, embezzlement and deceptive balance sheets. Interlocking directories meant managers of one
company served on supervisory boards of other companies. If
11

Although the main purpose of the Kreditbanken was the long-term capitalization of industry, they performed a variety of functions including those of
stock broker, underwriter, and supplier of short-term credit [Neuburger, 1977].
12
See Dykxhoorn and Sinning [1989a] for a more detailed discussion of
German corporate directorates. The authors translated H. Gottschalk, Die
Lehren aus den Aktienskandalen der Nachkriegszeit, (Frankfurt, 1934) for their
analysis.
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the boards, who selected management, exposed fraud, then
their judgement would have been called into question. Thus,
directors rarely challenged management directly [Dykxhoorn
and Sinning, 1989a].
Gallhofer and Haslam [1991] explain that corporate and
banking institutions actively promoted secret reserves and conservatism for stability.13 Corporate management, supported by
national protectionism, promoted conservative accounting. Numerous reasons existed for creating secret reserves, i.e., the
limitation of profit distributions to minority shareholders, protection of creditors (the Kreditbanken), independence from the
Reichsbank credit system, and the hiding of WWI profits obtained from government contract work [Gallhofer and Haslam,
1991; Northrop, 1938; Stolper, 1940]. However, Abel [1971] asserts that protection of creditors remained the dominate reason
for government permissiveness on secrecy regarding capital accumulation until World War II. Secret reserves solidified and
amplified the position and power of one group, the banks
(Kreditbanken).
Voss [1933] explains that while secret reserves would preclude an auditor from conferring a certificate that the accounts
were correct, they would not prevent the examiner from confirming that the accounts agree with the legal requirements.
Secret reserves ". . . are in principle allowed by the law" [Voss,
1933, p. 532]. Gallhofer and Haslam [1991] agree that the German government not only condoned, but encouraged secrecy to
ensure capital accumulation as well as confidentiality. Forrester
[1984] implies that companies still employ secret reserves in
financial reporting, compelling analysts to adjust published German profits upward for these surpluses.14
The complex interrelationships between banks and AGs precluded the use of an audit as an effective monitoring device. The

13

See Gallhofer and Haslam [1991] for a discussion on how conservative
accounting created secret reserves. See Forrester [1977] for a discussion on how
early cameralist accounting, a type of stewardship system, also promoted conservatism by focusing on the preservation of feudal estate products.
14
A current edition of the Wall Street Journal [Aeppel, 1993, p. A10] provides
evidence that German use of secret reserves continues. In a recent effort to
b e c o m e listed on t h e New York Stock Exchange, a G e r m a n corporation,
Daimler-Benz AG, stated it will declare extraordinary profit of four billion
marks ($2.45 billion) from disclosure of secret reserves. The profit is the result
of application of uniform asset valuation methods on the balance sheet.
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failure of one institution would impact a host of related companies; thus, disclosure of fraud or ineptitude might result in a
chain reaction that would threaten the whole economic system.
B a n k s p e c u l a t i o n w a s f l a g r a n t e n o u g h in 1927 for t h e
Reichsbank to threaten credit restriction [Northrop, 1938]. The
warning went unheeded as both corporations and banks obtained foreign funding. When the foreign supply of credit ceased
with the growth of National Socialism, economic collapse occurred [Schmidt, 1934].
Only the failure of the corporate/banking structure to function effectively for the national good brought state intervention
resulting in the 1931 Presidential Decree and ensuing amendm e n t to the Company Law requiring audits. The citizenry
looked to nationalism and a planned economy for a cure to
economic hardship. The public no longer accepted corporate/
banking paternalistic expertise and anti-individualism as criteria to maintain the traditional situation of conservation and secrecy. The p a p e r next discusses the d o m i n a n t a c c o u n t a n t
groups involved in the emergence of the Presidential Decree and
the following legislation.
GROUPS INVOLVED WITH THE
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE OF 1931
Following Porter's methodology, the analysis highlights the
interaction between primary groups involved with the formation
of the Company Law that required mandatory audits. First, this
section identifies three main accounting groups, academics, the
book examiners and audit companies. Then the analysis explains how the three groups interacted with the political sector
in d r a f t i n g t h e C o m p a n y Law t h a t e s t a b l i s h e d t h e n e w
Wirtschaftsprüfer profession.
The Evolution

of the Book

Examiners

The auditing profession evolved through a slow and controversial process. Both Dykxhoorn a n d Sinning (1989a) and
Buchholz (1939a) discuss the emergence of auditors. The book
examiner (vereidigte Bücherrevisor) originated through the Germ a n court system as an expert witness and trustee in liquidation disputes. As with the development of Company Law,
Prussia was the leader in accounting and auditing regulation.
Lander (province) courts originally swore in auditors, but by
Published by eGrove, 1993
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1900 the Chambers of Commerce assumed the responsibility for
swearing in and appointing book examiners, although they
m a i n t a i n e d v a r y i n g a d m i s s i o n c r i t e r i a [van Dien, 1930;
Gallhofer and Haslam, 1991].
The Prussians began regulating book auditors as Certified
Book Examiners (CBEs) in 1926 [Dykxhoorn a n d Sinning,
1989a]. An examination served as the means of certification and
admission to practice. The Prussian Chamber of Commerce law,
which introduced rules for the examination and admission of
auditors, served as the regulatory body. Chambers in other
Lander soon followed the Prussian example [Buchholz, 1939a].
Schourp [1930] and van Dien [1930] assert that accounting
groups developed n u m e r o u s associations to address profess i o n a l interests. 1 5 The Verband deutscher
Bücherrevisoren
(V.D.B.), representing certified (sworn-in) auditors, originated
in 1896 and became the major accounting organization, besides
audit and trust firms, to supply practitioners [Schourp, 1930;
Gallhofer and Haslam, 1991; Buchholz, 1939a]. Besides requiring that the applicant be certified by a chamber of commerce or
other official authority, the V.D.B. required that the potential
m e m b e r pass an examination given either through the certification process, the Leipzig Commerce College or by the V.D.B.
itself [van Dien, 1930; Schourp, 1930].
Audit and Trust

Companies

The most powerful group of accountants that competed
with the book examiners for control of the profession were the
bank auditors. Bank auditors became an effective force through
large audit and trust firms, the Treuhandgesellschaften.
Banks
first created the companies in the beginning of the twentieth
century to obtain financial information for credit decisions and
for monitoring the operations of their obligees. Dykxhoorn and
Sinning [1989a] and Schourp [1930] cite as an example the
founding by the Deutsche Bank of the Deutsche Treuhandgesellschaft, a public accounting firm that is still in existence today.
Buchholz [1939a] adds that with growing industrialization
and increasing demands for audits, joint-stock audit firms de15
Locke [1984], however, maintains that the early German accounting profession had no powerful cohesive associations, as did the British, to regulate the
occupation. German organizations were more like collegial brotherhoods whose
members possessed similar occupational and educational backgrounds.
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veloped that were independent from the banks. The book examiners (vereidigte Bücherrevisoren), perhaps a remnant of German
liberalism, urged the development of an auditing profession independent from other businesses, i.e., the banks [Dykxhoorn
and Sinning, 1989a]. The predominant universals of protective
nationalism and paternalism, inherent in German cooperative
capitalism, however, supported the bank/cartel relationship and
the existence of the bank-controlled audit firms. While van Dien
[1930] asserts that bank influence on auditors had ended by the
late 1920s, Forrester [1984] concludes that the banks never lost
control, even after WWII.
The Treuhandgesellschaften
also founded an organization,
the Verband Deutscher Treuhand-und
Revisionsgesellschaften
(V.D.T.R.), in 1919 to promote mutual interests of bank audit
firms. By 1929, this group consisted of approximately 80 audit
and trust firms [van Dien, 1930, p. 16].
The Role of German Academics in the Accounting

Profession

Academics influenced both book examiners and bank auditors in molding the G e r m a n accounting profession. Locke
[1984, p. 215] concludes that academics "were the driving force
behind the discipline." They developed accounting theory, devised curricula, instructed the practitioners and were influential
in the auditing profession. Academics joined both the V.D.B.
and the V.D.T.R.16
Locke [1984] concludes that in Europe the greatest professional impact on business management occurred in Germany,
and mainly t h r o u g h the accounting profession. Abel [1971]
notes that accounting was included in the discipline of business
economics (Betriebswirtschaftslehre).
Business management and
accountants did not receive their education at universities but at
commerce colleges, which initially taught a form of cameralist
administration. The first commercial college was established in
1898 at Leipzig and the second in Cologne in 1901 [Locke,
1984]. Other colleges became established in major German cities from 1901 to 1919 [Forrester, 1977].

16
Van Dien [1930] notes that accountants frequently belonged to more than
one organization and that most auditors who were members in local associations also belonged to the V.D.B. These smaller organizations probably were not
effective in instituting changes within the profession.
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Leading professionals, such as Schmalenbach and Bünger,
perceived of college as the means to standardize knowledge and
to achieve status through public recognition as a technical expert [Schourp, 1930; Voss, 1930]. Schourp [1930] implied that
practitioners who received no accounting training, except
through apprenticeship, were considered inferior to those with
specialized academic backgrounds.
By 1926, standardization became legitimized when legislation instituted a uniform exam for CBEs which was graded by a
board that consisted of at least two members of the V.D.B. [van
Dien, 1930; Schourp, 1930].17 Although a college education was
never a condition for admission to the profession per se, an
aspirant practically required a college education to pass the
exam.
Accounting academics both exemplified and sustained German ideology. Abercrombie et al. [1986] argue that education
serves as a primary means of introducing and maintaining a
dominant philosophy of a nation. Business economics, emerging from the discipline of cameralist administration in the universities, sanctioned nationalistic protectionism in industry. The
accounting emphasis on expertise reflected German Romantic
individualism that stressed the human intellect. The existence of
business economics at the German colleges, in particular the
specialized accounting program at Leipzig, and German societal
regard for professional expertise were primary factors in enabling the accounting profession to be so influential in industry.
The Influence of the Three Groups on the 1931 Decree
Academics, book examiners and bank auditors interacted
through conflict, then compromise, to establish the new exclusive tier, the Wirtschaftsprüfer. The newly approved auditors
were those who had a power base through the V.D.B. and the
Treuhandgeseltschaften.18 These two groups already had demonstrated proficiency and had a large share of the audit clients.
While most factions of the profession united to champion
standardized educational requirements among the Lander
17
Note that the U.S. certification exam first appeared in 1896 just prior to
the turn of the twentieth century, but was not uniform across all states until
1952 [Carey, 1969].
18
Academics were also prevalent in the new profession. Government statistics as of June 30, 1938, report that out of 1126 Wirtschaftsprüfer 568 (50.4%)
were academicians [Buchholz, 1939a, p. 122].
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[Locke, 1984; Graves, 1987; Bünger, 1926], hostility between the
CBEs and the bank-controlled audit companies hampered a
consolidated effort to promote mandatory audits [Dykxhoorn
and Sinning, 1989a]. Dykxhoorn and Sinning [1989a] explain
t h a t while the CBEs and the i n d e p e n d e n t
Treuhandgesellschaften, both desiring to expand their list of clients, supported
mandatory audits for all stock companies, the Kreditbanken opposed the compulsory examinations. Bankers, who frequently
were also shareholders and directors of major corporations,
feared losing control of management through disclosure and
external audits.
By 1929, however, the V.D.B. and the bank auditors had
compromised sufficiently to propose a bill that would merge the
two audit groups into one profession, that of the "Public Acc o u n t a n t and Trustee" (Revisor und Treuhänder) [van Dien,
1930], later to become the Wirtschaftsprüfer.19 Despite the att e m p t in the 1920s at self-regulation, van Dien [1930] and
Grossmann [1930], recognizing professional internal conflict,
predicted that the German legislature would never adopt the
Bill. The drafters themselves were not completely satisfied with
the results and many Lander still opposed a unified profession.
Most of the admission and professional regulations, however,
included in the newly proposed bill were the same as those
finally instituted in the 1931 Presidential Decree.
Although reflective of an increasing German propensity towards nationalism, the 1931 Decree and ensuing legislation also
provided evidence of professionally advocated self-regulation
that employed federal licensing and a dual system of supervision. The law divided the responsibility for monitoring the profession between the government Chambers of Commerce and a
new professional organization, the Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer
(IdW). 20 The Chambers appointed Wirtschaftsprüfer
and forwarded complaints to admissions boards that investigated and
tried cases [Voss, 1933]. Later the WP Chamber of Auditors
(Wirtschaftsprüferkammer)
became the public sector organization responsible for oversight of and disciplinary action against
19

Van Dien [1930] notes that the original draft was in existence as early as

1926.
20

The profession, not waiting for federal enactment, founded a national association in 1930, the National Institute of Auditing and Trustee Work
[Forrester, 1977 and Luck, 1984]. The national association established in 1930
was the predecessor to the IdW.
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members of the profession [Dykxhoorn and Sinning, 1981]. The
IdW represented the Wirtschaftsprüfer on matters of standard
setting, self-regulation and public accounting affairs [Voss,
1933]. Buchholz [1939a, p. 117] referred to the IdW as the ". . .
overall professional check." The monitoring function of the two
organizations became practically inseparable and indiscernible.
As Dykxhoorn and Sinning [1981] explain, the affiliation between the IdW and the Wirtschaftsprüferkammer, is extremely
close even today. Both main offices are housed in the same
building in Düsseldorf.
By 1937, an amended Company Law officially ranked the
CBEs at a middle tier, below the prestigious Wirtschaftsprüfer.
While both groups competed for general accounting services,
only the elite Wirtschaftsprüfer could perform the mandatory
audits of stock corporations after implementation of the 1931
Company Law [Buchholz, 1939a; Voss, 1933]. In 1933, the National Socialist Federal Rights Union (NSRB) dissolved the
V.D.B. A newly formed Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer had replaced the V.D.B. as the representative organization of accountants.
Although German accountants emphasized technical expertise as a means of fostering objectivity in financial reporting,
they lacked the organizational cohesiveness to promote uniformity in accounting principles [Voss, 1933; Singer, 1943]. The
crusade for uniform cost accounting to enhance national productivity never carried over extensively to financial reporting
[Abel, 1971; Singer, 1943]. Lack of widespread corporate ownership and government confidence in the corporate/banking alliance precluded national interest in standardization of financial
accounting. The 1931 Company Law was generally vague regarding implementation of accounting principles such as "reasonable" depreciation and "fair" value of assets [Voss, 1933].
Additionally, few auditing rules existed. Even after the 1931
Presidential Decree establishing the WP, the profession's representative organization, the IdW, provided little guidance on the
issuance of audit reports or on conducting examinations [Voss,
1933; Niehus, 1969].
The originally drafted bill demonstrated that, despite internal conflicts, the auditing profession, not the German government bureaucracy, initiated professional regulation. Buchholz
[1939b] and Schourp [1930] depicted the profession as independent (auditors were never civil servants), but accepting of the
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State through national regulation. Only the lack of cohesiveness
among the book examiners and the bank auditors, and a government preoccupied with overwhelming economic issues had
delayed legislation until the economic crises of the early 1930s.
While disclosure was more defined than under previous codes,
protectionism and conservatism were still in evidence. The Government still operating under a penchant for secrecy continued
to condone secret reserves [Semler, 1938].
The Permeation of Nationalism, Paternalism and
Anti-individualism
in the German Accounting Profession
German capitalism might be best described as cooperative
capitalism. The private sector produced the goods and services
while the State condoned consolidation to ensure economic stability and the nation's well being. Germans did not eulogize
market competition, which they regarded as inefficient and destructive, engendering conflict not consensus. German nationalism created a climate conducive to cartelization and the use of
accounting as a tool to promote economic stability and to enable those who controlled cartels to accumulate capital.
German paternalism made acceptance of cartels possible
and industrialists' and bankers' claims, that they subordinated
their own interests to society's, plausible. The cameralist tradition, exhibited in the commerce colleges, reflected the spirit of
noblesse oblige. Nationalism, paternalism and Romantic individualism enjoined Germans to work for the c o m m o n good; resulting in cooperative capitalism that formed an ideological
framework under which the institutions of cartels, banks and
the accounting profession operated. A harmony of interests between the Kreditbanken and the cartels and a lack of concern for
individual property rights, precluded a concern for minority
shareholders, financial disclosure, and independent monitoring.
Education reinforced the concept of paternalism and Romantic individualism, by permitting individuals to develop their
minds and talents to improve society through technical expertise. The German accounting profession promoted expertise as
its predominate attribute. The introduction of business economics, Betriebswirtschaftslehre,
into the commercial colleges contributed to the standardization of accounting education, and
empowered the accounting profession to assume the role of "expert" in the business community. Accounting served as the tool
to gauge efficiency. Despite emphasizing technical expertise and
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standardized rules as goals in financial accounting, however, no
uniform professional auditing standards existed in Germany until the 1930s.
By the 1930s, the German accounting profession was just
beginning to emerge from a nascent state. Practitioners sought
to gain professional status and influence through enhanced education and federal licensing. Evolution towards professional
maturity was exemplified by the fact that by the late 1920s,
German accountants had drafted legislation not only mandating
audits, but establishing an elite national profession. The lack of
cohesiveness, however, commonly found in the early stages of
group evolution, prevented the German profession from uniting
to achieve legislative recognition until the economic crises of
the 1930s. Nationalism, by then more completely entrenched in
German politics, became evident in federal licensing and by
1931 resulted in a unified profession under the IdW.
CONCLUSION
The emergence of the German accounting profession shows
that the cultural attributes described by Abercrombie et al.
[1986] provide explanations of political actions. The lack of
competitive market forces per se does not imply a corresponding
lack of demand for audits or the absence of an accounting profession. Without widespread stock ownership and a free market
to allocate resources, monitoring of management operations
can be provided by other methods. In the case of Germany,
bank auditors furnished this mechanism until economic crises
proved internal examinations suspect.
This study concurs with Abel's [1971] conclusion that business reforms evolve only if economic needs arise. Economic crisis, not the nascent accounting profession, resulted in legislative
action mandating audits. The emerging accounting profession
was not capable of successfully confronting the existent corporate/banking alliance to significantly impact financial reporting
or the demand for audits.
The role of the German banks, not only as creditors, shareholders and speculators, but as interlocking directors of cartels,
meant the economic collapse of one institution, the banks, affected the other, the cartels. The German government could no
longer continue a hands-off approach. Secrecy no longer functioned to maintain stability but had resulted in financial collapse. Independent monitoring became mandatory to protect
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the nation, but Germany had to look to the expertise of the
public accounting profession for the watch-dog mechanism,
now acquiescent towards national regulation. The economic crises of the 1930s precipitated federal legislation, but the propensity in Germany to focus on communality made national control
acceptable to the members of the accounting profession.
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